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29 September 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NRO ExCom Meeting at 11 a.m., 29 September

1. Present were Secretary Vance, General Carter, Dr. Fubini, and Dr. McMillan.

2. The meeting opened by Mr. Vance stating that he had several things he wished to take up with me. It was apparent that he had been well briefed prior to the meeting and had copious notes from which he spoke. Action: For future guidance, this is a technique that might well be adopted by DCI and DDCI. Also, since McMillan appears to be thoroughly witting of most of the activities on the West Coast and Fubini has no hesitancy about speaking authoritatively on any subject, I consider it advisable to have the DCI backstopped by Mr. Bross and Dr. Wheelon from here on out. Additionally, I consider it highly desirable, as a result of the attacks placed upon me today, that we have an advance agenda if we're going to discuss matters substantively.

3. Mr. Vance stated that he had been briefed on a contracting problem at the Advanced Projects Area for Lockheed (Sunnyvale, which he called "The Little Skunkworks"). He stated that there appeared to be three contracts in question -- one on the installation of the Stellar Index Camera, one on systems integration with Lockheed, and one amounting to a piddling [redacted] for some pin-pullers or other incidental hardware. He stated it was his understanding that our Security Officer had instructed Lockheed not to sign any of these contracts and that as a result thereof, Lockheed did not sign the contracts. Dr. McMillan stated that as soon as he had found out there was a security problem, he had convened a panel including CIA membership and that the security panel had now obtained full agreement as to the procedures that should be followed at Lockheed. Vance urged, therefore, that we now lift our ban on signing the contracts.

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4. I stated that I had not seen the panel report on security but that if CIA members had agreed to it and as soon as I had checked it out in the Agency with my own Security people and if it gave me no problem, I was prepared to accept it. I stated, however, that this was not prejudging the merits of having Greer complete the three contracts in question. McMillan said he took a dim view of holding up projects on the basis of security when in fact security was not the matter questioned. I stated clearly for the record that, so far as I knew, the Director had not authorized any changes of any kind in the CORONA Program and that it had been agreed that no changes would be made without DCI approval. This included contracts as well as security procedures. I further stated that Mr. Kearton had telephoned me from Lockheed and I had reiterated this statement. Kearton confirmed that this was his understanding and this was the basis for a letter he had furnished McMillan. I stated that I had called McMillan and told him of my conversation with Kearton and that there should have been no misunderstanding. McMillan then quoted from a letter Greer had gotten from Kearton tending to substantiate McMillan's claim that [redacted] our contracting officer, had instructed Kearton not to sign the contracts. I stated I had not seen the Kearton letter but [redacted] instructions to Lockheed were identical with my instructions to Kearton and that it would please me to get a copy of the Kearton letter. McMillan said he would furnish me a copy. McMillan then said that it was his clear understanding that taking Aerospace on in the CORONA Program included adjustment of the systems integration and systems engineering contract with Lockheed so that it would be an Air Force contract. He stated that it involved nineteen people out of Lockheed and that the contract had previously been Air Force's but last year had been handled by Leach. All he wanted to do now was to get it back under Air Force auspices. McMillan said this was part and parcel of the Aerospace function and he could not operate without it under Air Force auspices. I stated that I had no intention of authorizing this kind of contract without Mr. McCone's approval and, further, I had no intention of establishing the kind of CIA backstopping and input that had previously been agreed on the West Coast under these circumstances. I stated

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that participation in the CORONA Program was a two-way street and required not only clean intent but cooperation as well. I stated that I had no intention whatsoever of building up a CIA asset on the West Coast to leave it out in left field and that it was my clear understanding that we had agreed to consolidate the CIA assets under Mr. Crowley to have a definite and clear-cut input into the CORONA Program across the boards and, specifically, to cover the entire payload which was CIA responsibility. Fubini interjected at this point to indicate that I was welching on a prior agreement and that the understanding was purely to send one or two men to the West Coast to work with Greer's organization to learn more about the program and increase their competence. I refused to accept the word "welching" and required him to withdraw it which he did threefold. McMillan stated that it was his understanding that I was to develop a plan by which Mr. Crowley and others would go to the West Coast. I stated that I had such a plan but the Director had left in such a hurry on his trip that I had not had time to clear it with him; that as soon as he returned I would develop the full particulars and inform the Executive Committee of what we plan to do. I reiterated that I was not prepared to establish a group on the West Coast to "watch the parade go by," but that they would have full responsibility for all security and all contracting presently handled by CIA and, in addition, they would sign off on and deliver a complete payload to the agency responsible for tying it into the booster and firing it. In addition, they would follow along throughout the entire process to ensure that the marriage was properly consummated. I stated that I was not reneging on Mr. McCone's prior reluctant acceptance of the majority view to have Aerospace in the act although we were still of the opinion it was a bad idea. I stated that I was not agreeing to the Stellar Index Camera changes at this time because my main concern was the collection of intelligence and that we had had a remarkably successful CORONA Program throughout the months since May. It was my understanding that the changes proposed for SIC would probably not be effective until late next spring and that they were designed primarily to augment a military mapping program. Fubini confirmed this and I said I was not prepared to take the risk of messing up a good intelligence collection program until our technicians and

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experts had fully signed off on the new proposals as being totally feasible and in keeping with intelligence collection. McMillan said he had written in June of 1963 to Greer and Ledford, telling them to get on board this program and work jointly on it and that CIA had had every opportunity to be a full participant in the new program but had been uncooperative throughout. I reiterated my position that I was not here to indulge in vituperation and histrionics but I was here to protect the interests of the intelligence community and I was not convinced that this type of activity would so protect it.

50X1 5. Vance asked me to take a look at the panel report on security handling of the contracts at the Advanced Projects Area and if this gave me no problem, to see if I could not go along with the systems integration transfer to Lockheed as an Air Force contract and the [] hardware contract. I told him if it did not involve the payload (which nobody seemed to know), I would discuss it with my people and see if it gave us a problem. McMillan said it was his belief that it did not in any way involve the payload but was purely the systems engineering of tying the payload into the booster. However, he was not sure of this and would have to check it himself. As can be seen from the foregoing, the discussion was relatively inconclusive and I made no commitments except to look at the problems in the light of this discussion. Action: DD/S&T to advise me so that we can thoroughly clue in Mr. McCone prior to any other meetings. Also, advise me as to any agreements we have made on security handling in connection with the panel report mentioned by Dr. McMillan. Also, to get the copy of the Lockheed letter and analyze it as to facts. It is perfectly apparent that NRO and McMillan are keeping very close book on all of the CIA actions and responses to their requests.

6. Mr. Vance brought up the problem of vulnerability of the OXCART, particularly as it was concerned with radar cross section. He stated that the original estimates on radar cross section had been increased four or five times from what we had hoped for and that he just wasn't sure whether we had accurate

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measurements and if we were exerting everything possible to reduce the radar cross section. McMillan stated he thought we should get a couple of experts to take a look to see if the contractors were in fact on top of this problem. I said I had no objection to this but was there anything wrong with the current system -- was anyone preventing him from getting inputs in or getting the information? McMillan said no, but he felt that since we seemed to be so far below specifications now that we should get on top of it with some of the experts who had been in the act originally, with a view to seeing if anything could be done to improve the situation. I asked him what he had in mind and he said an ad hoc panel consisting of Ed Purcell who had been on top of vulnerability for a long time, [redacted] who had designed the dragon's teeth on the leading edge, and Gene Kiefer whom he had already asked to be a party to this. Specifically, he wanted them to look at the efforts that had been made to date to determine the validity of the measurements that had been and were being taken to see if the electronic cloud concept was profitable, and in general to see what, if anything, might be done to reduce the radar cross section. I said I could not object to this sort of objective approach to the problem and would talk to my people to see if we wanted to add anybody to the group. I suggested that Gene Fubini is an acknowledged expert on radar cross section but he said he was too busy on other matters. I said I would be in touch to see if this raised any problems with my people. Action: DD/S&T to recommend any additional membership to the panel and the terms of reference. Since OXCART is under Program B, it would be appropriate for the panel to operate under Program B aegis.

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7. Dr. McMillan handed me an envelope containing a copy of the memorandum to Dr. Wheelon reference FULCRUM. I asked if I should read it now or take it back with me. Mr. Vance said it did not make any difference since it had already gone. This indicates clearly that McMillan's memo to Wheelon was cleared in advance by Vance. I did not read it at the table but merely took the envelope. Action: DDCI to talk to DCI. This again throws in the gauntlet on how DCI intends to operate the FULCRUM Program. DD/S&T to prepare briefing memo for DCI

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with particular reference to the memo signed by Mr. McCone directing DD/S&T in specific detail how they were to conduct the program.

8. I distributed copies of the 28 September report on SKYLARK status. There was no particular discussion except Fubini pointed out on the page of "Decisions" that items 3 and 10 might be construed as indicating that authority for the use of electronic countermeasures had been obtained whereas in fact none existed. I told them that a COMOR estimate had indicated the necessity of making from three to six flights monthly throughout the next calendar year to get the same general coverage of the U-2's as required by USIB, and that this would total 53 successful flights from November through October. I also told them that our vulnerability studies indicated that the OXCART would have increasing vulnerability over Cuba as flights increased. I did not get into details.

9. I briefed Secretary Vance on the current status of our infrared camera and he was intensely interested. McMillan and Fubini winked at each other and Fubini made several comments intended to discredit the capabilities of the infrared camera. I stated that the Agency was exerting every possible effort to find a means of [redacted] and that this was one which promised considerable success. Further, that we were continuing biological studies and many exotic, clandestine activities with a view to getting the basic intelligence needed. Mr. Vance indicated his thorough support of this and any other effort we were putting into this subject.

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
10. During the conference Mr. Sylvester asked Mr. Vance for permission to send Pentagon-accredited foreign press to the demonstration at Edwards. After some discussion, he and I agreed this would be all right.

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/s/

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director

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